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Abstract 
This report outlines the results of a study of severe road traffic accidents in 
Norway, triggered by drivers at work. The aim has been to examine whether and 
to what extent risk factors of these triggering drivers and their vehicles can be 
traced back to work-related factors. The study is based on data from the Accident 
Analysis Groups (AAG) of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA), 
reports from The Transport Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) and 
interviews with nine experts. The quantitative analysis of AAG data shows that too 
high speed for the circumstances, failure to use seat belt and insufficient 
information gathering were the most important risk factors in fatal accidents 
triggered by drivers at work. The qualitative analysis of reports from AIBN and 
expert interviews uncovered the following work-related factors considered central 
for traffic safety: follow up of drivers' speed, driving style and use of seat belt, pay 
systems, safety culture, risk assessments, procedures/work descriptions and 
training. The AIBN reports and the interviews indicate that the following 
framework conditions influence traffic safety: time pressure, competition, type of 
transport, accident investigations/inspections. The majority of the interviewees 
held that work-related factors with potential implications for traffic safety are 
insufficiently monitored in controls and inspections. 
1. Introduction
Road transport often represents the greatest risk that we are exposed to during a 
regular working day. This is especially true for professional drivers and other 
employees driving during work. In these cases, employers have a legal 
responsibility to ensure that employees' traffic safety is optimal. 
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It seems that employees driving in their work are more accident prone than other 
employees. Data from 1988-1993 shows that the accident risk of occupational 
drivers was 9.5 fatalities per 100 million person hours, while it was three for other 
occupations (Elvik 2005). 
Traffic accidents account for between 20 and 40 percent of work-related accidents 
in industrial countries (ETSC, 2010a; Fort et al., 2010). If we include the journey 
to and from work, the rate may be as high as 60 percent (ETSC, 2010a). 
Overall, 39 percent of fatal occupational accidents in the EU are traffic accidents 
(ETSC, 2009), while between 22 and 24 percent of work-related deaths in the 
United States are caused by traffic accidents (Driscoll et al., 2005). In Australia 
and New Zealand, the shares are 31 and 16 percent respectively (Driscoll, et al., 
2005).  
In Norway 36 percent of fatal road accidents involve employees driving at work 
(Phillips & Meyer 2012). Although work-related accidents make up substantial 
shares in the accident statistics of road transport, knowledge is lacking on the 
relationship between accidents and work-related risk factors in transport 
organizations.  
A better focus on work-related, underlying organizational causes in transport 
organizations may inform preventive measures and improve transport safety 
(Banks 2008; Gregersen, Brehmer & Morén 1996; Murray, Ison, Gallemore & 
Nijjar 2009). Norway’s National Transport Plan (2010-2019) states that 
organizations should include transport safety as an important part of their Health, 
Safety and Environment (HSE) work. This is also emphasized by the European 
Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA 2012), and the European 
Transport Safety Council (ETSC 2010). As knowledge is lacking on the 
relationship between accidents and work-related risk factors in transport 
organizations, these important risk factors are neither addressed properly by 
transport organizations, nor by regulatory authorities. 
This paper outlines the results of a study of severe road traffic accidents in 
Norway triggered by drivers at work. The aim of the study has been to examine 
whether and to what extent risk factors of these triggering drivers and their 
vehicles can be traced back to work-related factors.  
The study is based on information available in the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration's (NPRA) Accident Analysis Groups (AAG) database on fatal 
accidents in the period 2005-2011, 10 reports from the Accident Investigation 
Board Norway (AIBN) and information from nine research interviews conducted 
with experts from government bodies engaged in accident investigations, worksite 
inspections and roadside controls.  
 
2. Previous research on work-related road transport accidents 
 
2.1  Prevalence of work related transport accidents  
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Phillips and Meyer (2012) map the incidence of work-related accidents in Norway 
in the period 2005-2010. They find that a total of 41 percent of fatal road 
accidents in Norway involve at least one driver who is at work, or driving to or 
from work. Thirty percent of fatal road accidents involve professional drivers at 
work (at least one), while six percent involve at least one person who is driving in 
his/her work but who is not a professional driver. Ten percent of fatal accidents 
involve at least one person driving to or from work.   
The European Transport Safety Council (ETSC) has made risk associated with 
work related driving a priority. In 2009, the ETSC launched the project PRAISE 
(Preventing Road Accidents and Injuries for the Safety of Employees) (ETSC 
2010b). According to a PRAISE thematic report, 40 percent of traffic accidents 
involve drivers at work, or driving to and from work. In the UK, between 25 and 
33 percent of all serious road accidents are work related (i.e. only driving at 
work), out of which 23 percent involve commercial vehicles “on the job” and 
seven percent light vehicles “on the job” (SafetyNet, 2009). According ETSC 
(2009), vehicles involved in work-related accidents are: light car (42 percent), 
heavy vehicle (heavy goods vehicles, buses) 28 percent and vehicles with two or 
three wheels (6 percent).  
In France, ten percent of all traffic accidents are probably work-related (driving at 
work) (Charbotel, Martin, & Chiron, 2010). In France, it is also estimated that 18 
percent of traffic accidents involve people driving to or from work. In Australia, 
there are three times as many traffic accidents involving driving to and from work 
as accidents driving at work (Boufous & Williamson, 2006).  
Even if the proportion of work related traffic accidents is constant over time, the 
number of work-related traffic accidents can still change. Therefore, it is crucial to 
measure the risk when driving at work, or to/from work. According to Driscoll 
(2005), the risk of death per 100,000 person years of driving at work is 1.69 in 
Australia, 0.99 in New Zealand, and 0.92 in the USA, as compared to 2.3 in 
France (Charbotel, et al., 2010). 
 
2.2 Causes of work related transport accidents 
Assum and Sørensen (2010) conducted a thematic analysis of fatal accidents 
involving heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) in the period 2005-2008. 135 HGVs were 
involved in 130 accidents during the period. HGVs refer to goods vehicles 
weighing more than 3,5 tonnes, e.g. lorries with and without trailer, tractors with 
or without semi-trailers, tank lorries (cf. Nævestad et al 2014). 
Their study of risk factors in the 44 fatal accidents where HGVs were the 
triggering party indicates the following risk factors: Driver: high speed for the 
conditions reported in 28 accidents. Inattention, fatigue and lack of seat belt use 
were each reported in 7-9 accidents. Vehicle: insufficiently /faulty secured goods, 
bad brakes, blind spots and tyres were the most frequently reported factors. Road: 
fixed objects near the road, poor road surfaces, high asphalt kerbs, slippery roads 
and lack of median guard rails were most frequently mentioned. 
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Phillips and Meyer (2012) find that time pressure/stress/fatigue and lack of seat 
belt are the most important risk factors for drivers at work. A total of 37 percent 
of drivers who were working when the fatal accident occurred did not use safety 
equipment (usually seat belts). 25 percent of the drivers who drove to or from 
work when the fatal accident occurred, did not use safety equipment (usually seat 
belts). 
The majority of work-related road accidents in the UK are caused by a collision 
between two vehicles (Husband, 2011). In Australia, cars and vans skidding on 
slippery roads to collide with oncoming vehicles are described as typical of work-
related accidents (Mitchell, Driscoll, & Healey, 2004). Typical risk factors were 
high speed, possible fatigue, and wet weather, and/or alcohol/drugs. 
Compared to other drivers in general and to people driving their own cars at work, 
those who drive company cars in their work have a heightened risk of all types of 
accidents, even when controlling for exposure (Broughton, Baughan, Pearce, 
Smith, & Buckle, 2003 ). This so called “fleet car effect” has been demonstrated 
in several countries (Lynn & Lockwood, 1998). 
Drivers of heavy vehicles have a lower death risk per hour than other drivers 
(Elvik, 2007). Although it is difficult to establish to what extent this is due to 
driver behaviour, and to what extent it is due to the protection provided by a 
heavier vehicle, we know that the latter factor is important (Elvik, 2007). Drivers 
of European HGVs and buses are killed in only 13 percent of the fatal accidents 
they are involved in (DaCoTa, 2010). It is also the case in Norway that accidents 
involving heavy vehicles carry a greater risk of death to other drivers than for 
drivers of heavy vehicles (Haldorsen, 2010). 
According to data from EU-19, fatal accidents involving  HGVs are most frequent 
on weekdays between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Fatal bus accidents occur with the 
same frequency on weekends as on weekdays. On weekdays, fatal bus accidents 
are more frequent during peak hours, both early morning and late afternoon 
(DaCoTa, 2010). 
Finnish research shows that drivers of passenger cars between ages 50 and 65 who 
are employed or self-employed, have a higher risk of work-related accidents than 
younger drivers (Salminen 2000). Research in France shows that drivers between 
25 and 34 years are more prone to accidents on the way to or from work 
(Charbotel, et al., 2010). British research shows that men are even more over-
represented in work-related accidents than in other road accidents (Husband, 
2011). 
Several studies show that company cars often are involved in accidents at high 
speeds. Newnam, Watson and Murray (2004) found that work-related drivers 
would report more speeding and a higher intention to speed in a work vehicle than 
their personal vehicle. Studies from the UK and Australia have shown that fleet 
car drivers are more prone than others to drive at high speeds, when tired, and 
without a seat belt (Husband, 2011; Symmons & Haworth, 2005). Risky 
behaviour can therefore at least partly explain the fleet car effect.  
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To sum up, it seems that few of the studies analysing accidents involving drivers 
at work focus on work related risk factors. Some studies do, however direct 
attention to organizational factors and framework conditions. Bjørnskau and 
Longva (2009) compare safety culture and safety outcomes in various modes of 
transport. In this study, the authors developed and tested a model that describes 
the relationship between framework conditions, managements’ focus on safety, 
formal safety systems, safety culture, individual attitudes and behaviour and 
safety outcomes. They found clear differences in safety culture between different 
modes of transport. Aviation scored highest on the safety culture index, followed 
by metro and bus. These differences were in line with the level of safety in the 




3.1 Conceptual clarification 
Work-related traffic accidents. In this article, the term work-related accidents 
refers to accidents involving professional drivers at work and employees driving 
in connection with their jobs. The term does not include drivers going to/from 
work, as in Phillips and Meyer (2012). Working drivers, unless self-employed, are 
employed by organizations committed through the Working Environment Act to 
facilitate good road safety for their drivers/employees through HSE work. 
Work-related risk factors. Work-related risk factors refer to all factors that are 
influenced by employees’ work situation, and which may in turn influence 
transport safety. These can be traced back to management and organization, but 
also more general factors which are usually not associated with HSE, e.g. pay 
systems, work scheduling systems, organization of drivers' contact with 
forwarding agents and customers (Nævestad & Bjørnskau 2014).  
Fatal road accidents. In Norway and most other European countries, fatal road 
accidents are defined as traffic accidents leading to at least one fatality within 30 
days of the accident (Elvik, et al. 2009) 
Risk factors. In road safety work, the term “risk factor”, rather than the term 
“cause” is normally used to explain accidents (Sørensen, Nævestad and Bjørnskau 
2010). Risk factors are divided into accident factors and injury factors. Accident 
factors are factors contributing to the occurrence of the accident, while injury 
factors are factors contributing to the accident’s serious consequences. Risk 
factors are also divided into factors associated with the driver, the vehicle, the 
road and the road environment. Finally, risk factors are also divided into 
triggering risk factors and underlying risk factors. Triggering risk factors include 
events that occurred during the last seconds before the accident (e.g. falling 
asleep), and which triggered the accident. Underlying risk factors refer to factors 
that can explain and contextualise the triggering risk factors (e.g. long working 
hours, stress).  
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Triggering vehicle: In this study, we look at accidents with drivers of vehicles that 
the AAG define as triggering for the accident. The AAG database requires that 
one of the involved road users is defined as “triggering”. The term "triggering" is 
not necessarily, but frequently, synonymous with legal liability. It generally refers 
to vehicles with the decisive triggering risk factors. (As we will see below, AAG 
rate risk factors according to their importance.) Defining a triggering vehicle may, 
however, sometimes be difficult, as accidents may involve several parties which 
have made mistakes and triggered the accident. It may for instance be difficult to 
identity one triggering party in an accident where unit A has failed to give way, 
while unit B has exceeded the speed limit considerably on a road with right of 
way (Haugvik and Holten 2013). 
 
3.2 Analysis of data from the Accident Analysis Groups  
All fatal road accidents are investigated by the NPRA in the form of regional 
Accident Analysis Groups (AAG). Since 2005 every fatal accident has been 
documented by means of in-depth reports describing the course of the accident, 
road and weather conditions and relevant aspects of involved road users and 
vehicles. (Haldorsen, 2010; Sørensen, Nævestad, & Bjørnskau, 2010).  
The reports are based on a common template, and use different data sources, such 
as print-outs from police interviews with the road users, or technical reports from 
accident sites and on vehicles involved (Haldorsen, 2010). For the vast majority of 
fatal accidents, there thus exists a separate report that can be reviewed to 
investigate its triggering or contributing factors. The AAG indicates the 
importance of each factor by weighting them according to the extent to which 
they have influenced the course of events. This scale runs from 1 to 3, where 1 = 
little, 2 = great and 3 = decisive. 
Some of the variables from the in-depth reports are transferred to an AAG 
database. This database can be used for studying fatal accidents and accident 
factors quantitatively (Sørensen, et al., 2010).  
The AAG database does not originally contain variables on driving at work. The 
data we use in the present study is therefore based on the work of (Phillips and 
Meyer 2012), who read through all the AAG reports and updated the AAG 
database with variables on drivers at work. The AAG reports contain information 
that can be used to identify drivers at work, although this information is not found 
in the AAG database, Especially, the AAG reports  frequently report road users’ 
trip purposes, which is now part of the report template.  
In addition to using information on trip purpose, Phillips and Meyer defined 
drivers as professional drivers if the report stated that transport of goods or 
persons was this person’s main task at the time of the accident, and if there was 
reason to believe that the driver was a driver by profession. In practice, this 
mostly applied to HGV, bus or taxi drivers at work. In this way, they created new 
variables and updated the AAG database. The most important new variables were: 
1) professional driver, 2) driving to or from work, 3) other driving at work. 
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Following the methodology of Phillips and Meyer (2012), we have read through 
all AAG reports from 2011 in order to update the AAG database with figures from 
2011. 
Since we have data on all drivers at work in the AAG material, including those 
who have not been defined as triggering, we also make comparisons of 
characteristics of triggering and non-triggering working drivers. This enables us to 
examine whether working drivers triggering fatal accidents differ from those who 
do not, when it comes to risk factors related to drivers and vehicles. Given that 
being involved in fatal accidents as a non-triggering party strikes drivers relatively 
arbitrary, it could be argued that the non-triggering drivers represent a kind of 
random selection and that certain characteristics associated with triggering drivers 
can be considered risk factors. We conducted such comparisons among the 
professional drivers in the sample (N = 430). 
 
3.3 Analysis of reports from the Transport Accident Investigation Board 
The AIBN has since September 2005 investigated road traffic accidents. AIBN 
conducts independent investigations clarifying the causes and course of traffic 
accidents in order to issue safety recommendations that may improve traffic safety. 
The AIBN only investigates some traffic accidents, especially accidents involving 
professional drivers, and accidents with a potential for learning. We have read 
through all of the AIBN reports, and focus on the 10 (of a total of 27) reports with 
safety recommendations on work related factors. 
In the analysis of AIBN data, we have compiled a list of the risk factors that are 
mentioned, and how often they are mentioned in the reports. We also focus on the 
AIBN’s description of individual work related factors, and the AIBN’s view of 
the causal relationship between work-related factors and factors related to the 
triggering drivers and vehicles.  
 
3.4 Interviews 
We chose to interview nine experts from different organizations involved in either 
inspections, controls or investigations of professional drivers and other employees 
who drive at work. We conducted these interviews to benefit from the experience 
of these experts on the importance of work related factors for traffic safety. We 
also wanted to get their views on challenges related to controls and inspections 
and their suggestions on potential measures addressing work related traffic 
safety.The interviewees were encouraged to present their impressions of and 
views on different topics. We used a semi structured interview guide in the 
interviews, focusing on results from AAG data, organizational risk analyses, 
procedures, training, seat belt use, speed/driving style, driving time and rest 
periods, vehicle inspections, salary, identifying risky work related factors and 
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positively influencing work related factors. 1 The analysis of interview data 
largely follows the topics of the interview guide. The topics and questions in the 
interview guide were for the most part based on our analysis of the AAG database 
and AIBN reports.  
 
4. Results from the Accident Analysis Groups 
 
4.1 Road transport accidents triggered by drivers at work 
The original number of vehicles in the AAG database for the period 2005-2011 is 
2177. This figure, however, includes some vehicles on which we do not have 
complete information. We have therefore excluded these vehicles from the 
analysis. When excluding these, the total number of vehicles studied is 1.646. 
These were involved  in 1.410 fatal accidents. A total of 501 vehicles involved in 
these accidents were driven by professional drivers, or others at work. 
Table 1 shows how many of the 501 vehicles driven by professional drivers or 
others at work involved in the 1410 fatal accidents in the period 2005-2011, that 
were defined by the AAG as the triggering vehicle. The table shows the number 
of vehicles. 
 
Table 1: Vehicles involved in fatal accidents in the period 2005-2011 by type of driver, 
and whether the driver was defined as triggering. 
 
 
Triggering vehicle? Total 
Type of driver Yes No  
Professional driver at work 151 279 430 
Other driver at work 40 31 71 
Not at work 828 371 1145 
Total  1019 627 1646 
 
Table 1 shows that 501 (430+71) of the 1646 involved vehicles that we have 
sufficient information about were driven by a person at work. 191of the 501 
involved vehicles that were used by drivers at work were classified as the 
triggering part of the accidents by the AAG. 151 of the 191 vehicles were driven 
by professional drivers, and the remaining 40 were driven by other drivers at work 
Figure 1 shows shares of triggering drivers in different groups of drivers.  
                                                 
1 This is given in Norwegian in Nævestad & Phillips (2013). 
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Figure 1: Vehicles involved in fatal accidents 2005-2011, based on type of driver and 
whether the vehicle was defined as the triggering part by the AAG. Percentages 
(N=1646).  
Figure 1 shows that the share of drivers defined as the triggering part were lowest 
among professional drivers, somewhat higher among other drivers at work and 
highest among the drivers whose driving were not work-related. 
 
4.2 Causes of the accidents triggered by drivers at work 
As noted, we define risk factors as accident factors, triggering accidents, and 
injury factors influencing the severity of the accidents.  
Figure 2 shows the accident factors of the triggering drivers that the AAG defined 
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Figure 2: The seven most frequent driver accident factors of great and decisive 
importance in the AAG’s analyses of fatal accidents involving triggering drivers at work. 
Number of times given great and decisive importance in accident reports in the period 
2005-2011. 
Figure 2 shows that ”lacking information gathering’, “too high speed for the 
circumstances” and “wrong decision” are accident factors given great or decisive 
importance by the AAG. The risk factor “lacking information gathering” 
generally refers to road users failure to notice e.g. signage, road conditions or 
other road users. This may be a result of inattention, distraction, failure to look 
and so forth. The risk factor “other” can be any conceivable accident factors, 
including work-related factors.  
The most frequently identified injury factors, contributing to the severity of the 
accidents are: “too high speed for the circumstances”, “lack of seat belts”, 
“illness/disease”, “securing of goods” and “well above speed limit”.  
In conclusion, the analysis of AAG data shows that speed too high for the 
circumstances, failure to use seat belt and insufficient information gathering were 
the most important risk factors in fatal accidents triggered by working drivers on 
Norwegian roads 2005-2011. This conclusion was supported by the analyses of 
the AIBN reports. 
Figure 3 shows the accident factors related to vehicles given great or decisive 
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Figure 3: The five most frequent vehicle accident factors of great and decisive 
importance in the AAG’s analyses of fatal accidents involving triggering drivers at work. 
Number of times given great and decisive importance in accident reports in the period 
2005-2011. 
The main accident factors related to vehicles were “visual obstruction in or on 
vehicle” (perhaps contributing to lacking information gathering), “wheels/tyres”, 
“brakes and steering”. The most frequently occurring injury factors related to 
vehicles were: “critical striking point”, “passenger car against heavy vehicle” and 
“insufficient chassis safety”. In conclusion, the analyses of the AAG data shows 
that the two most important risk factors related to vehicles in the accidents 
triggered by drivers at work were obstacles to vision in or on vehicles and 
wheels/tyres. 
 
4.3 Triggering drivers versus non-triggering drivers  
Since we have data on all drivers at work in the AAG material, including the non-
triggering ones, we study whether working drivers triggering (N=151) fatal 
accidents differ from non-triggering (N=279) ones, when it comes to certain 
aspects of drivers and vehicles. For the sake of simplicity, we only do these 
comparisons for the professional drivers in the sample (N = 430).  
In Figure 4, we show how non-triggering and triggering professional drivers are 
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Figure 4: Driver's age for vehicles defined as triggering (N = 151) and non-triggering in 
fatal road accidents in Norway 2005-2011 (N = 279). 
Figure 4 shows that the triggering professional drivers constitute larger 
proportions in the youngest and oldest group of drivers. However, a Chi-square 
test for independence indicated no significant association between age group and 
the share of triggering drivers, Chi-square (2, n = 432) =2.9, p=.24. Despite the 
lack of statistical proof, a tendency is apparent that is in line with other road safety 
research demonstrating that young and elderly drivers have higher accident risk 
than other age groups (Elvik et al 2009). It is also in accordance with 
abovementioned French and Finnish research on drivers at work (Salminen 2000; 
Charbotel, et al., 2010). 
Figure 5 shows the states of triggering and not triggering professional drivers, as 
they are reported by the AAG. Information on the state of the drivers was missing 





















Figure 5: Shares in different states for triggering (N=108) and non-triggering 
professional drivers (N=172) in fatal road accidents in Norway 2005-2011.  
A Chi-square test for independence indicated a significant association between the 
state that the drivers were in at the time of the accident and the contribution they 
made to triggering the accident, Chi squared (3, n=280) = 35.5, p <.001. 
Comparing triggering and not-triggering professional drivers, it is evident that the 
triggering drivers to a greater extent were in a state of hurry/stress, tired and under 
the influence by “other” (e.g. drugs or illness). The share of professional drivers in 
a normal state was somewhat lower among the triggering drivers than it was 
among the not-triggering drivers.  
Figure 6 shows how vehicles driven by non-triggering and triggering professional 






















Figure 6: Production years among triggering (N = 151) and non-triggering vehicles 
(N=279) in fatal road accidents in Norway 2005-2011. 
Comparing the vehicles driven by triggering and non-triggering professional 
drivers, we see that the vehicles that triggered fatal accidents are somewhat older 
than vehicles that did not trigger fatal accidents. The average year of manufacture 
for all vehicles triggering accidents between 2005 and 2011 was 2002, while the 
average year for vehicles not triggering accidents was 2003. However, the 
difference in year of manufacture was not significant, F (1, 403) =3.51, p=.06.  
 
4.4 Measures suggested by the AAG 
The AAG recommends a total of 57 different categories of measures against the 
fatal accidents where the triggering vehicle was driven by a working driver. In the 
same way that several risk factors are identified in each accident, the AAG 
recommends several measures for each accident. In total, the AAG recommends 
675 measures aimed at the fatal accidents involving the 191 vehicles driven by 
triggering working drivers. 
The majority (44 %) of the recommended measures were aimed at road/road 
environment,  26,9 % of the measures were aimed at the vehicle, 14,3 % were 
aimed at the driver and 14,6 % were aimed at what we refer to as “other” factors. 
It is important to note that the measures are classified by us and not by the AAG. 
 
5. Results from AIBN-reports and interviews 
We have seen that the AAG database focus little on work related causes, although 
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order to obtain data on work related factors, we have therefore analyzed AIBN 
reports and conducted expert interviews.  
 
5.1 Work related risk factors influencing road transport safety 
The Norwegian Work Environment Act (WEA) of 1977 obliges transport 
organizations to facilitate good transport safety for their employees through their 
HSE work. The Internal Control (IC) Regulations of 1996, require the managing 
director of an enterprise to ensure that the enterprise obliges with the WEA and 
works systematically with HSE. Employees must actively participate in this. 
Working actively with HSE means for instance to set safety objectives, defining 
responsibilities, identifying HSE problems, obtaining overviews of laws, planning 
HSE measures, following up and undertaking annual reviews of the company's 
HSE work together with safety representatives.  
 
5.1.1 Speed and seat belt as an organizational concern 
The most important risk factors in the AAG data were speeding and lacking seat 
belt use. Speed too high for the circumstances and failure to use seat belts are risk 
factors that employers may prevent by means of, e.g. organizational speed and 
driving style policy (approved, signed and followed by the drivers), organizational 
seat belt policy, monitoring the speed and driving style of each driver, installing 
maximum speed limiter (e.g. on 80 km/h instead of the mandatory 90 km/h) and 
seat belt warning. Such measures are suggested in the AIBN reports.2 
The interviewees did however, say that their experience indicate that transport 
companies largely treat the seat belt use of their drivers as drivers' individual 
concern and not as the concern of the organization. The situation is somewhat 
different when it comes to drivers' speed and driving style, primarily as this has 
economic implications for the companies.  
 
5.1.2 Pay systems 
When asked whether they had the impression that pay systems influence traffic 
safety in the transport industry, the majority of the interviewees said yes. They 
stated that most drivers have fixed salaries, salaries based on assignments, and 
that some element of piecework often is involved. This may motivate drivers to 
focus on keeping a high speed, finish assignments as early as possible, to be able 
to take extra trips to increase the salary, violate provisions on driving time and 
rest periods, and so forth. Several interviewees indicated that recording working 
hours and receiving pay based on hours of work to a little extent occur among 
goods transport drivers. We lack information on the prevalence of different pay 
                                                 
2 A recent Norwegian study shows that three transport companies with good safety cultures have 
implemented such measures (Nævestad & Bjørnskau 2014). 
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systems in the AAG and AIBN data, and suggest that more research should be 
devoted to this issue. 
 
5.1.3 Safety management system 
The 10 AIBN reports that we have studied often conclude that the companies 
employing the triggering drivers have failed to: 
1) Conduct (and document) risk assessment of especially critical operations,  
2) Use these risk assessments as a basis for work descriptions/procedures 
that the drivers could have consulted prior to work operations, or 
3) Use these risk assessments and work descriptions/procedures as a basis 
for a training program for drivers to make them prepared for the risks of 
their work operations. 
In the accidents described in the AIBN reports, the companies in question have 
failed in either one of these processes, or all of them. The AIBN refers to these 
three processes as a “safety management system”, and suggest that such systems 
should be mandatory for companies applying the government for transport 
permits. In practice, it seems that these requirements are in accordance with the 
requirements in the Internal Control Regulation of the Work Environment Act. 
The interviewees did not believe that most transport companies on a regular basis 
undertake risk analyses of especially critical operations, that they have a strong 
focus on work descriptions/procedures, or that they in general give drivers 
sufficient training. More research is needed on this issue. 
 
5.1.4 Safety culture  
When asked about the most important measures that transport companies may 
take to prevent accidents, several interviewees stated that feelings of 
responsibility and attitudes among employers is a central challenge. Several 
interviewees underlined that goods transport companies to a greater extent must 
recognize that they set the premises for the safety of their drivers' work. Some 
interviewees suggested that there is a cultural challenge in transport of goods, as 
companies in practice put a lot of responsibility for traffic safety on the driver, 
although the employer has a legal responsibility to ensure that the traffic safety of 
employees is optimal. We return to this. 
 
5.2 Framework conditions influencing traffic safety 
The AIBN reports and the interviews indicate that work related factors in 




5.2.1 Time pressure and stress from transport buyers/forwarding agents 
The majority of the interviewees believed that transport buyers and forwarding 
agents were pressing/stressing drivers. They had, however, no clear conceptions 
of the scope of such pressure. This is an issue requiring more research. 
Forwarding agents and transport buyers set the premises for drivers' speed and 
driving style as they decide when goods is bound to arrive and when drivers can 
start their trips. Interviewees stated that, route planning often is based on a 
minimum-time schedule, and factors that may cause delays are not necessarily 
taken into consideration. Several interviewees suggested that measures adding 
responsibility to transport buyers and forwarding agents should be introduced, as 
these may influence traffic safety. 
As noted, the analysis of AAG-data shows that the triggering drivers to a greater 
extent than non-triggering drivers were in a state of hurry/stress, tired and affected 
by other things. The majority of interviewees underlined that time pressure is a 
crucial problem in the transport industry, but that transport companies not 
necessarily focus on stress and hurry as a possible cause of accidents. 
Interviewees argued that time pressure is especially prevalent in companies 
working under less predictable conditions, for instance: short time assignments 
with low predictability, little long term planning and short client relationships 
(e.g. 2-3 weeks).  
The majority of interviewees did not believe that severe violations to the driving 
and resting time provision are prevalent in Norwegian transport companies. This 
was explained by the NPRA's good control routines of driving and resting time. It 
was mentioned, however, that controls have indicated some quite severe 
violations of work time rules, as many employees work several hours loading and 
unloading their cars without recording this kind of work. In these cases, the 
drivers may put their tachograph on “rest”. 
 
5.2.2. Competition 
Interviewees stated that time pressure is especially prevalent in the segments of 
the goods transport market that are characterized by the hardest competition. One 
interviewee mentioned that transport buyers often may say that they "know 
someone who is willing to do the job for a lower price". This may lead to drivers 
taking assignments with tight time margins, and make it difficult for companies 
and drivers focusing on delivering goods on time. Time pressures may cause high 
speed, and we have seen that too high speed is a very central risk factor in the 
AAG data. More research is needed on this issue. 
 
5.2.3 Type of transport 
Most interviewees held that traffic safety is better in public transportation than it 
is in goods transport. They explained this by stating that people is more "valuable" 
than goods, and that the requirements for public transport therefore are stricter. 
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These requirements apply to both drivers and equipment, making the standards of 
drivers and vehicles in public transportation better than those of goods transport. 
Interviewees suggested that public transport generally have a better safety culture 
and a higher prioritization of safety. 
Accordingly, interviewees stressed that transport of dangerous goods is 
characterized by high standards relating to drivers and vehicles, as the 
consequences of accidents are severe in this line of transport. Thus, this line of 
transport has special provisions with requirements regarding driver training, 
vehicles and so forth. This illustrates how type of transport has consequences for 
governmental requirements, transport companies' prioritization of safety and 
safety level.  
 
5.2.4 Regulation of transport safety in Norway 
The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (LIA) is responsible for overseeing 
that the Work Environment Act is complied with in transport organizations, and 
LIA must also be notified about fatal accidents. LIA was, however, only notified 
about 30 of about 66 fatal accidents involving drivers at work, 2005-2010 
(Phillips & Meyer 2012). LIA defines the transport sector as an "exposed 
industry" that it will direct much of its attention to in the period 2013-2016. The 
NPRA is responsible for technical vehicle control and for overseeing and 
controlling compliance with the drive- and rest rules in transport companies 
together with LIA. LIA and NPRA have both road side controls and company 
controls together, and they share responsibility for supervising the compliance 
with the provision regulating professional drivers' working hours. The police is 
also involved in road side controls of vehicles, and often cooperates with the 
NPRA.  
The majority of the interviewees held that work related factors with potential 
implications for traffic safety are insufficiently monitored in controls and 
inspections. When asked whether the government has sufficient tools versus 
companies at risk of experiencing traffic accidents, opinions of the interviewees 
were mixed. Interviewees answering yes largely said that the government has 
good enough tools at their disposal, but that they must use them more actively. 
Interviewees answering no stated that the government should focus more on 
heavy vehicles and latent, deeper causes. Most of them agreed that the AIBNs 
suggestion to make it mandatory for transport companies to have a system of 
safety management to get transport permits could be a good way of filtering 
dubious companies out of the industry.  
Finally, interviewees  mentioned that the government is facing a great challenge 
when it comes to following up controls of foreign transport companies. It may be 
difficult to know how to issue obligations to these companies, and not the least 
ensure that they pay possible fines. 
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6. Concluding discussion 
This paper has outlined the results of a study of severe road traffic accidents in 
Norway, triggered by drivers at work. The aim has been to examine whether and 
to what extent risk factors of these triggering drivers and their vehicles can be 
traced back to work related factors.  
 
6.1 Methodological limitations 
The major data source in the study is the quantitative AAG-data on all on fatal 
accidents triggered by drivers at work in Norway in the period 2005-2011. We 
have used the AAG-database to describe all the existing risk factors related to 
these accidents. Results show, however, that the AAG database contain little 
information on work related risk factors.3 We therefore conducted interviews with 
relevant experts and studied reports of the Accident Analysis Investigation Board 
for Transport in Norway (AIBN). Both these qualitative data sources provided us 
with information on work related risk factors, and shed light on the risk factors we 
found in the AAG-data related to drivers and vehicles  
Nevertheless, the qualitative interviews (N=9) and AIBN-reports (N=10) are 
based on fewer cases than the quantitative AAG-data (N=2177). The AAG-data 
include all road accidents involving drivers at work in the period 2005-2011. 
Although we do not know to what extent the qualitative data are representative of 
the actual situation on Norwegian roads, they are one of the few data sources that 
we can use to shed light on the aim of our study. Although the AIBN data include 
relatively few cases, they provide insights in work related risk factors that require 
time consuming in-depth investigations, thus limiting the number of studied cases. 
Moreover, though the interviews may be biased by the interviewees’ subjective 
opinions, these opinions are based on the interviewees’ vast professional 
experience from government bodies engaged in accident investigations, worksite 
inspections and roadside controls.  
For these reasons, we stress that the qualitative data in our study depict 
hypothesized relationships between framework conditions, work related risk 
factors and risk factors related to drivers and vehicles. These relationships should 
be examined further in future research, and the results of this research could be 
used to improve the AAG-databases, e.g. by including work related risk factors. 
 
6.2 Professional drivers trigger fewer accidents than other drivers 
The study shows that the share of drivers defined as the triggering part were lower 
among professional drivers and drivers at work, than among other drivers. This is 
                                                 
3 Administrators of the AAG-database indicated in conversations that the AAG reports generally 
contain more information about work-related matters than the database, and that some of this 
information is lost when transmitted from reports. We therefore recommend that variables for 
work-related factors should be included in the AAG database. 
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in line with previous research, which shows that professional drivers’ risk of 
triggering accidents is less than half the risk of other road  users’ risk of triggering 
accidents (Blower 1996; Wang, Knipling, and Blincoe, 1999; Craft, 2000). The 
suggested explanation to this is professional drivers’  comprehensive driving 
experience (TSH 2014).  
 
6.3 Excessive speed, lacking seat belt use and lacking information gathering 
The quantitative analysis of AAG data, based on over 2000 accidents, supports 
other studies suggesting that surplus speed is a main cause of accidents triggered 
by drivers at work (Newnam, Watson, & Murray, 2004; Mitchell, Driscoll & 
Healey 2005; Husband 2011). 
Our data also support that fatigue is a major risk factor, and that a high share of 
accident-involved working drivers do not wear seatbelts. The data also supports 
previous studies suggesting that the very oldest and youngest working drivers may 
be more likely to trigger serious road accidents (Fig 4) (cf. Blower 1994); and that 
time pressure is an important contribution to serious accidents triggered by 
working drivers (Fig 5). 
International research also reports that drink driving is a risk factor in work 
related driving (e.g. Symmons & Haworth, 2005; Mitchell, Driscoll & Healey 
2005). We found that triggering drivers to a greater extent than non-triggering 
were affected by “other” (e.g. alcohol/drugs). 
 
6.4 Ways in which fatigue and stress can trigger fatal road accidents 
Our study also adds to existing studies by identifying ways in which factors such 
as fatigue and time pressure can trigger fatal road accidents. Most often, drivers at 
work who trigger fatal road accidents: 
- fail to gather essential information from the traffic environment; 
- make poor decisions in traffic; 
- operate the vehicle unskilfully; and 
- position the vehicle wrongly in the road. 
Our study supplements existing studies by attempting to identify work-related risk 
factors that may contribute to serious accidents triggered by drivers at work. In 
addition to speeding, time pressure and fatigue, our quantitative findings suggest 
that vehicle deficits often play a decisive role in triggering work-related road 
accidents (Assum and Sørensen 2010). The analyses of the AAG data shows that 
the two most important risk factors related to vehicles in the accidents triggered 
by drivers at work were obstacles to vision in or on vehicles and wheels/tyres. 
 
6.5 Framework conditions and work related factors influence safety 
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Findings from the in-depth AIBN report analysis and qualitative interviews also 
suggest how risk factors associated with work-related driving may be rooted in 
framework conditions. For instance pay systems may encourage drivers to drive 
too long and too fast. Our findings suggest that work-related accident risks may 
best be reduced by addressing the systems that encourage driver behaviour, rather 
than addressing the driver behaviour itself.  
In the foregoing, we discussed Bjørnskau og Longva’s (2009) model of safety 
culture in different transport sectors. Figure 7 shows our revised version of this 
model. We have adapted it to our above mentioned data on the importance of 
framework conditions and work-related factors influencing road safety. The 
model depicts hypothesized relationships that should be tested in future research. 
 
 
Figure 7: Modified safety culture model, based on  Bjørnskau og Longva (2009). 
(Hypothesized relationships that should be tested in future research) 
The causal arrows in the model indicate, in accordance with the findings reported 
in the current study, that the level of safety among drivers at work results from 
drivers’ actions and vehicle quality, which are influenced by safety culture and 
safety systems, stimulated by management’s emphasis on safety which finally is 
effected by framework conditions, e.g. time pressure, competition, type of 
transport (goods or people), regulation, driving time and rest rules and the Work 
Environment Act. These six framework conditions were highlighted in the 
interviews and the AIBN reports.  
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Analysis of reports from AIBN and expert interviews brought forth the following 
work related factors considered central for traffic safety: follow up of drivers' 
speed, driving style and use of seat belt, pay systems, safety culture, risk 
assessments, procedures/work descriptions and training. 
We may also refer to work-related risk factors as organizational risk factors, 
which can be traced both to formal and informal aspects of organizations’ 
safety work. While organizational safety structure refers to the formal aspects 
of safety work (how things should be done), organizational safety culture 
refers to informal aspects (how things are actually done) (Antonsen 2009; 
Nævestad 2010).  
If an organization is to control hazards effectively, it must systematically 
work with both its formal and informal defences (barriers) against those 
hazards (Reason 1997). The purpose of this organizational defence is both to 
prevent organizational members from acting in unsafe manners, and to 
minimize the consequences if they act unsafe or are subjected to danger in 
their work.  
Excessive speed for the conditions and lack of seat belt use are risk factors that 
employers can take formal actions against, for instance through a speed limit 
policy, seat belt policy, monitoring of each individual’s speed and driving style, 
maximum speed limiters (e.g. on 80 km/h), and seat belt warning. Following the 
advices of the AIBN, transport organisations should also establish formal 
management systems involving; 1) risk assessments of current risks, that 2) 
inform company procedures, that lay the ground for 3) safety training of 
employees.  
However, for such formal safety measures to work properly, the informal, daily 
focus on safety both among managers and employees must be in place. We may 
refer to this as organizational safety culture, which often is treated as shared and 
safety relevant way of thinking or acting that is (re)created through the joint 
negotiation of people in social settings (Nævestad 2010). Managers’ focus on 
safety is a key element of good safety culture (Reason 1997). Organizational 
safety culture is crucial for transport safety, as it is the single factor most likely to 
influence other organizational barriers against hazards (Reason 1997). Above, we 
noted however several safety cultural challenges in organizations with drivers at 
work. 
 
6.6 Little focus on work-related risk factors in road transport 
The present study indicates that there is potential for a stronger focus on work 
related risk factors both in the AAG-database, among government bodies 
inspecting and controlling the sector and among transport companies. Perhaps this 
situation will change as the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority defines the 
transport sector as an "exposed industry" that it will direct much of its attention to 
in the period 2013-2016. 
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When it comes to the transport companies, some interviewees suggested that there 
is a cultural challenge in transport of goods, as companies in practice put a lot of 
responsibility for traffic safety on the driver. This is done in spite of the fact that 
the employer has a legal responsibility to ensure that the traffic safety of 
employees is optimal. Some explanations were suggested by the interviewees 
describing this cultural challenge: 1) The Norwegian Road Traffic Act establishes 
that the driver has the main responsibility for traffic safety, regardless of whether 
he or she is employed, 2) There is a tendency among employers to believe that 
professional drivers do not need training as they have a driver’s license, and 3) 
There is a tendency among employers to treat employed drivers as self-employed 
drivers. We do not know the prevalence of these attitudes, but they nevertheless 
point to questions that could be examined in future research. 
In conclusion, it seems that employees in transport companies are in a special 
position compared with employees in other companies. Additionally, they often 
work alone on the road, and they may seldom see their colleagues or manager. It 
has been suggested that it is difficult to regulate safety in transport organizations, 
as employees generally are on the move, away from the main office. These issues 
should be examined in future research. 
 
6.7 Issues for further research  
It is important to note that the depicted relationships in the model presented in 
figure 7 sum up the quantitative and qualitative results of our study. We have not 
tested these relationships, and they should therefore be treated as issues and 
hypotheses that should be examined in future research. 
We recommend that future research aiming to improve safety among professional 
drivers and drivers at work should focus on the following issues:  
1. Speeding   
2. Seat belt use 
3. How fatigue and stress is manifested in driver behaviour 
3. Time pressure and stress from transport buyers/forwarding agents 
4. Pay systems in the road transport sector  
5. Systems for safety management in the road transport sector 
6. Drivers' vs. organizations' responsibility for traffic safety  
7. Safety culture. 
 
6.8 Measures that could improve transport safety 
In the following, we sum up different measures that may strengthen the efforts 
directed at surveying and improving work related factors with implications for 
traffic safety: 
 24 
1. measures directed at speed too high for circumstances and seat belt use 
2. System for safety management (as a requirement for transport permits) 
3. Increasing the responsibility of transport buyers/forwarding agents 
4. Variables for work related factors in the AAG database 
5. Control of and sanctions directed at foreign goods transporters 
6. Focus on transport companies at risk 
7. Transport of dangerous goods as a source of inspiration 
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